The role of the medium of exchange in competition among bidders and its effect on returns to stockholders in corporate takeovers are investigated. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, our model shows that stockholders of both acquiring and target firms obtain higher returns when a takeover is financed with cash rather than equity, and that returns to target shareholders increase with competition. The modelpredicts that the fraction of synergy captured by the target decreases with the level of synergy. Finally, it is shown that, as competition increases, the cash component of the offer as well as the proportion of cash offered increases.
tition. Investigations of the effect of the medium of exchange have found that stockholders of both acquiring and target firms earn higher returns when the acquisition is financed by cash rather than stock [see Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1987) , Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1989) , Franks, Harris, and Meyer (1988) , Travlos (1987) , Huang and Walkling (1987) , and Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983)] .
In this article, we investigate the role of the medium of exchange in competition among bidders, and its effect on the returns to the stockholders of both the acquirer and the target. We provide a theory that is consistent with the empirical findings cited above regarding competition and the medium of exchange. In addition, our model explains how the synergy is shared between the acquirer and the target and yields additional testable hypotheses relating the effect of competition (both potential and actual) in the market for corporate control to the medium of exchange used in acquisitions.
Most of the insights of this analysis are established in a model with two types of acquirer, High and Low. The value of the combined firm under the High type is greater than that under the Low type. Initially, a potential acquirer arrives and makes an offer with a specific medium of exchange, which the target can either accept or reject. If the offer is rejected, there is a costly delay before another offer can be made by this bidder. At that time, another potential acquirer may enter the fray. If this occurs, there is competition between the two bidders, and the highest bid may be accepted or rejected by the target. If rejected, the process repeats after a further delay.
In this setting, under symmetric information the target receives a higher dollar amount if it is acquired by the High type, but receives a higher fraction of the synergy if it is acquired by the Low type. This is because the Low type faces greater competition than the High type and is willing to offer the target a higher proportion of the synergy. Moreover, the offers are accepted without delay in equilibrium.
If only the acquirer knows its type, then there is a unique (in payoffs) separating sequential equilibrium in which the High-type acquirer uses a higher amount of cash and the Low type uses a higher proportion of equity and the values of the offers are the same as in the symmetric-information case. Since the fraction of the synergy offered by the Low type is higher than that offered by the High type, the latter clearly has no incentive to mimic the former by offering equity. Similarly, since the dollar value of the offer made by the Low type is lower than that made by the High type, the former does not have an incentive to mimic the latter by offering cash. As in the symmetric-information case, the offers are accepted without delay.
The model has the following empirical implications: First, takeovers financed with cash are associated with higher returns to the stockholders of both the acquirer and the target than takeovers financed with equity; second, the fraction of synergy captured by the target decreases with the level of total synergy, while the dollar amount captured increases with the level of total synergy; third, an increase in competition among the bidders raises the fraction of the synergy captured by the target and the amount of cash used to finance the takeover; finally, the cash fraction of the offer also increases with competition.
While, to our knowledge, no paper has explored the role of the medium of exchange in competition between bidders, several theories have been advanced to explain the effects of the medium of exchange [see Hansen (1987) , Fishman (1989) , and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1989) ].
1 In these models bidders whose private information is more favorable (regarding either their own premerger values or the synergy) use cash as the medium of exchange, and this explains why the stock prices of bidders react more favorably to cash offers than to stock or other security offers. However, unlike our model, these models do not explain why the targets' stock prices also react in the same fashion. In Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1989) , the target's share price rises at the announcement of the acquisition by an amount that is independent of the medium of exchange. This is because the bidder is constrained to make an offer that is acceptable to all types of targets so that there is no separation of the target types in equilibrium. In Fishman (1989) , the reaction of the target's stock price to the announcement of the acquisition is ambiguous: Only if the minimum preemptive cash offer is greater than the expected value to the target from competition (given that there is no preemption) will the target's stock price react positively to a cash offer. A similar ambiguity arises in Hansen (1987) .
The article is organized as follows. In Section 1, a model with two types of bidders is described. In Section 2, equilibrium offers under symmetric information are analyzed. In Section 3, asymmetric information is introduced and a nondissipative signaling equilibrium is obtained in which the High type offers more cash and less equity than the Low type. In Section 4, the effect of potential competition on the medium of exchange is analyzed, and in Section 5, the effect of actual competition on the medium of exchange is considered. In Section 6, the model is extended to more than two types of bidders and the conditions under which the results obtained for the two-type case continue to hold are derived. In Section 7, we present our conclusions.
A Model with Two Types
Consider a firm (the target) that may be a source of synergy if combined with other firms. The source of the synergy may be economies of scale, inefficient incumbent management, combining complementary resources; etc. We concentrate on the division of this synergy and its relation to the medium of exchange. For convenience, we consider only mergers and full tender offers in which the target ceases to exist as a separate entity.
The target is identified as a source of synergy by a potential acquirer. The acquirer could be one of two types. If the acquirer is type l(h), the synergy is L(H), where H > L. While only the acquirer knows its type, it is common knowledge that the acquirer is type l with probability q or type h with probability (1 -q) . The premerger values of both the acquirer and the target are common knowledge, and, for simplicity, are assumed to be zero. The acquirer makes a bid that the target can either accept or reject.
2 The bid consists of an amount of cash and a fraction of equity in the combined firm. If the target rejects the initial bid, a second bid can be made by the acquirer only after a delay. 3 The important feature of the delay is that it is costly to both the acquirer and the target. 4 One reason for the cost is that the benefits of the merger are postponed. The discount factor represents the cost of delay.
If the target rejects the initial bid, other potential acquirers may enter. The probability that a new bidder will enter in any given period is denoted by r. There is no cost of entry. All new bidders have the same distribution of synergy [ H with probability (1 -q )], which is common knowledge, although the value of the synergy is private information. Upon entry of a new bidder, both bidders compete in an English (progressive) auction without delay. At the end of the auction, the higher-value bidder will bid the value of the lower bidder, or a higher value, if necessary, to prevent the target from rejecting the bid and waiting for a higher bid. management seeks to maximize shareholders' wealth. We ignore taxes in order to concentrate on the signaling aspects of the medium of exchange.
Bidding under Symmetric Information
The medium of exchange is clearly irrelevant under symmetric information. However, an understanding of the bidding process under symmetric information is helpful since the equilibrium payoffs under asymmetric information are the same as under symmetric information.
Suppose that the target is facing a bidder of known type h. The target will accept any offer that equals or exceeds its expected payoff from rejection. Therefore, the equilibrium offer is equal to the present value of the target's expected payoff from rejection. This value is given by
The last term represents the payoff to the target if there is no competition in the next period. This assumes that the payoff to the target from rejection in the next period, if there is no competition, is the same as the payoff from rejection in this period. Since the arrival process is stationary, the unique stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy is for the type h bidder to bid V(h) in each period if there is no competition [see Berkovitch and Khanna (1989) ]. The second term represents the payoff if the competition is from type b. In this case the target will receive H, the outcome of the English auction. The first term represents the payoff if the competition is from type l. If L > V(h), the target will accept L, the outcome of the English auction. On the other hand, if L ≤ v(h), the type h bidder has to bid V(h) since the target will reject any lower bid. Solving Equation (1) for V(h), Similarly, type l acquirer's equilibrium bid is given by
The last term represents the payoff to the target if there is no competition, in which case, under stationary conditions, the target will receive V(l). The second term represents the payoff if the competition is from type h. If L > V(h), the outcome of the auction, L, will be accepted by the target. If L ≤ V(h), the type h bidder will bid V(h) since any lower bid will be rejected by the target. The first term represents the payoff if the competition is from type l and if v(l) < L. Note that the assumption that v(l) < L is necessary to ensure that type l will enter the bidding. Solving Equation (4) for V(l), we get
The proportion of the synergy obtained by the target as a function of the acquirer's type is given by
The following proposition describes the relative payments of the two types of acquirers.
Proposition 1.
. Type h pays a lower fraction of the synergy than type l, but pays a higher dollar amount.
Proof. See the Appendix. n
The result may be understood as follows. Suppose that L ≥ V(h).
Then, the incremental synergy if the first bidder is type h rather than type l is H -L. However, the expected incremental payoff to the target is less than H -L because it obtains this amount only if the second bidder is type h, and this occurs with probability less than 1. Hence, the target is able to capture only a fraction of the incremental synergy of the first bidder so that, although the dollar amount it obtains increases with the synergy of the bidder, the fraction of the synergy it receives decreases. Let { C, α } denote an offer, where C is the amount of cash and α is the fraction of the equity. In equilibrium the offers must satisfy
The loci of equilibrium offers { C, α } of types h and l are represented by the curves AB and CD, in Figure 1 . Condition (8) implies that these curves are monotonically decreasing and strictly concave and that they intersect once at where (9) and (10) Under symmetric information, all cash and equity offers by type l (h) along the loci AB (CD) are equivalent. In order to explain the composition of the offers in equilibrium, we now introduce an informational asymmetry between the bidder and the target.
Separating Equilibrium with Cash and Equity
In this section, it is assumed that only the bidder knows the value of the synergy. The bid { C, α } specifies C, the amount of cash, and α, the fraction of equity in the combined firm, offered to the target. It is assumed that the cash is raised by a riskless debt issue. 6 Knowing the bid, the target updates its beliefs about the bidder's type and decides whether to accept or reject the bid. If the target rejects the bid, competition may develop as in the symmetric-information case. If there is no competition the bidder bids again and the process repeats.
A strategy for each type of bidder is a function that prescribes a bid for each possible history given that there has been no previous acceptance. The target's strategy is a function that prescribes for each infor-mation set of the target whether to accept or reject the last bid. The equilibrium concept used is the sequential equilibrium of Kreps and Wilson (1982) . Each player chooses his best strategy given his beliefs, taking the other players' strategies as given. The beliefs are determined by Bayes' rule whenever possible. In a separating equilibrium the strategy of the bidder reveals its type.
In describing the equilibrium, we eschew unnecessary formalism without compromising rigor. Suppose a separating equilibrium exists in which type i makes the offer be the target's payoff in equilibrium if the bidder is type i. For the target to accept the offer, V e (i) must be greater than or equal to the value from rejection when the target believes the bidder to be type i. The key result proved in Proposition 2 is that, in the (unique) separating equilibrium, the value from rejection is V(i), the same as the value from rejection under symmetric information. Hence the equilibrium strategy for the bidder is to bid V(i), which is the lowest acceptable bid.
8 Therefore,
The following conditions must be satisfied to ensure that neither bidder type has an incentive to mimic the other:
and Equation (11) [(12) 
] ensures that type l (h) does not mimic type h (l).
Since the target's equilibrium payoff is V(i) when the bidder is type i, curve AB in Figure 1 represents the locus of all possible acceptable offers type l can make while curve CD represents the locus of all possible acceptable offers type h can make. However, only offers on the portion AE of AB are incentive compatible, that is, satisfy condition (12). Similarly, only offers on the portion ED are incentive compatible, that is, satisfy condition (11). Therefore, all equilibrium offers must lie on the envelope AED, with type l making offers on AE and type h making offers on ED.
To see the intuition behind this argument, consider the special case where offers of cash only or equity only can be made. Clearly the target has no incentive to reject a cash offer of V(h) or higher since it cannot do better irrespective of the type making this offer. Similarly, the target has no incentive to reject an equity offer of α (l) or higher. The target has no incentive to accept cash offers less than V(l) and equity offers less than α (b), irrespective of its beliefs, since the payoffs from accepting these offers are lower than its expected payoff from waiting, irrespective of the type of the bidder making these offers. For cash offers between V(l) and V(h) and equity offers between α (b) and α (l), there exist several sets of target beliefs that make it optimal for it to reject these offers.
The above intuition can be extended to offers involving a mixture of cash and equity. The following proposition summarizes the above discussion and establishes a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In any separating equilibrium type h pays a total amount of V(h) and type 1 pays a total amount of V(l), without delay. Type h pays more than C* in cash and type l pays less than C* in cash.
Proof. We shall show that the following set of strategies and beliefs constitutes a unique (with respect to payoffs) separating equilibrium. For the sake of simplicity, we do not state here the actions and beliefs of the players in the off-equilibrium path of actual competition that might arise if the first bidder's offer is rejected. These actions and beliefs are stated in detail in the proof of Proposition 6. In any given period, if no competition has arrived thus far, 
4. Target's set of beliefs: Offers {C, α} where C ≥ C* imply type h and {C, α} where C < C* imply type l, regardless of previous beliefs.
In the proposed equilibrium there will be no actual competition since the bidder who arrives in the first period will make the equilibrium offer (taking into account, of course, the competition that might arise if an unacceptable offer is made) and that will be accepted.
Given this set of strategies and beliefs, type b has no incentive to make offers since these offers will be accepted resulting in a payoff greater than V(h) to the target. Similarly, it has no incentive to make offers {C, α} where since by the definition of C* the true value of these offers is strictly greater than V(h). Also, type h has no incentive to make any offer that will be rejected by the target since upon rejection, if competition develops, its payoff next period will be less than its current period payoff from the equilibrium offer. If competition does not develop, the bidder is in the same situation next period as it is now but incurs the cost of delay. Hence, it will not make such offers. This rules out all other off-equilibrium offers. By a similar line of reasoning, it can be easily shown that the prescribed strategy for type l is optimal.
The target is better off accepting offers {C, α} where C ≥ C* and and offers {C, α} where C < C* and C + α (L -C) ≥ V(l), given its beliefs. If type i, i = h, l, makes such offers, the target's payoff is greater than or equal to V(i), the symmetricinformation payoff. All other offers should be rejected. If, for example, type h makes the offer {C, α} where C ≥ C* and C + α (H -C) < V(h), the target's payoff from rejecting the offer is V(h) given its belief that such offers come from type h [see Equation (1)]. Hence it is optimal for the target to reject the bid. Similar arguments show that it is optimal for the target to reject offers {C, α} where C < C* and
In order to show uniqueness, first note that any sequential equilibrium must be such that the target accepts any bid greater than or equal to its expected payoff from rejecting the bid, and the bidder bids the target's expected payoff from rejection. As shown in the symmetric-information case, the unique bid that satisfies these properties is V(i) for type i, i = h, l. Since in the separating equilibrium the types are revealed before the target has to respond, these are the unique payoffs in such an equilibrium. n
Effect of Potential Competition on Payoffs and the Medium of Exchange
In order to investigate the effect of the intensity of potential competition on the sharing of synergy and the medium of exchange, we consider variation in r, the probability that a competing bidder will emerge in any period. It is easily verified from Equations (1) and (4) that V(h) and V(l) are increasing functions of r. This conforms to our intuition that the target's payoff should increase with increasing competition among bidders.
Proposition 3. . The target's share of the synergy increases as the intensity of potential competition increases.
Consider next the effect of the intensity of potential competition on the medium of exchange. Specifically, we investigate the effect of r on C*. Since C* is the minimum cash that a type h bidder has to offer to separate itself, it can be considered as a measure of the amount of cash in the offer. The relevance of this measure becomes more obvious when we extend the model to a continuum of types. As the following proposition shows, C* is a strictly increasing function of r.
Proposition 4.
. The minimum amount of cash the type b bidder has to offer in order to separate itself increases with the intensity of competition.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The effect of r on C* is through V(h) and V(l). As r increases, both v(h) and v(l) increase (Proposition 3). However, their effect on C* is in opposite directions. C* increases with v(l) and. decreases with V(h).
The reason C* increases with V(l) is that, in equilibrium, type l will pay exactly V(l) in total if it pays C* in cash. As long as C* remains constant, this amount is unchanged [see Equation (8)]. Therefore, if V(l) increases and C* remains constant, type l can mimic type h by paying the same amount as before. Since this is profitable for type l, C* has to increase.
For similar reasons C* decreases with V(h). As the proposition shows, it turns out that the effect of V(l) on C* dominates that of v(h).
Proposition 4 suggests that the amount of cash used in acquisitions increases with potential competition. Since type h differentiates itself by offering more cash, it is also interesting to investigate whether the cash component as a fraction of the amount paid by type h, C*/V(h), is increasing in r. It turns out that this result does not hold in general in our model. What we find is that C*/V(h) is an increasing function of r if L > V(h), as stated in the following proposition. The proof is straightforward.
Proposition 5.

Actual Competition
In proving Proposition 2 we assumed the outcome of actual competition, namely, that the bidder's payoff under actual competition is less than its equilibrium payoff under potential competition. In this section we prove that this outcome is the unique equilibrium outcome and investigate the effect of actual competition on the medium of exchange. To incorporate actual competition, we add to the model in Section 1 the possibility that a competitor may enter in the first period, immediately after the first bid is made. In order to be con-sistent with the model in Section 1, we assume that the competitor enters with probability r. In this case the game evolves as follows.
The first bidder makes a bid with a mixture of cash and equity. If no competitor enters in that period the target either accepts or rejects the first bid. If the target rejects the bid the game evolves in the same fashion as before. If a competitor enters in the first period, the game evolves as an auction in which the competitors bid alternately without delay. When no bidder revises its bid, the outstanding offers become the final offer set from which the target may choose one. The target may reject both offers in which case the competing bidders may bid again after a delay. We use a final offer set instead of a final bid because a bid has two dimensions, namely, cash and equity. In many cases it is not possible to tell which of the two offers is superior without specifying the belief system of the target. For example, consider the final bids { V(h), 0} and {0, 1} where V(h) > L. If the target believes that the second bid is made by type h it should accept this bid and reject the first one. On the other hand, if it believes that the second bid is made by type l, it should accept the first bid. The following proposition describes the unique equilibrium payoffs.
Proposition 6.
I. If no competition develops, the equilibrium outcome (payoffs and mediums of exchange) is identical to that in Proposition 2.
II.
1. If competition develops between two type l bidders, the final accepted bid is { 0, 1 }.
If competition develops between two type h bidders, the final accepted bid is { H, 0 }. 3. If competition develops between type h and type l, the final accepted bid is { L, 0 } if V(h) < L; otherwise, it is { C, α } where C ≥ L and C + α (H -C) = V(h). 9
Proof. See the Appendix. n If actual competition is between two bidders of the same type, the winning bidder gets nothing; if it is between type h and type l, type h gets H -L. Note that under actual competition the optimal medium of exchange is quite often the comer solution: either all cash or all equity. Equilibrium offers of cash and equity are possible only if type b competes against type l and v(h) > L. 10 In contrast, when there is only potential competition, equilibrium offers can involve mixtures of cash and equity in all situations.
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Generalization to a Continuum of Types
In this section we extend the results of the previous sections to a continuum of bidder types. In Section 6.1 we derive the conditions under which a separating equilibrium with symmetric-information payoffs exists, as in the two-type case. We also present a simple geometric interpretation of this equilibrium. 12 In Section 6.2 we show that no pooling equilibrium exists.
Separating equilibria with symmetric-information payoffs
We first consider the case of potential competition. Let F (·) represent the probability distribution of the bidder types. The support of F (·) is the interval [a, b] , where a > 0. A type x bidder possesses synergy value x. V(x) denotes the target's expected payoff when it faces a bidder of type x under symmetric information. The remainder of the notation is the same as in Section 1.
We assume that V(x) < x for all x. If this is not true, type x has no incentive to enter the market. V(x) is given by If s, the synergy of the bidder arriving next period (if one arrives), is less than that of type x, the target will get the maximum of V(x) and s. If this synergy is greater than x, the target will get the maximum of V(s) and x. If no bidder arrives the target will receive a bid of V(x) next period from bidder x. As in the two-type case, define 11 It can be shown that pooling equilibria do not exist under actual competition. If V(h) < L, actual competition always reveals the types of the bidders. This is because when types b and l compete, type b can easily reveal itself by offering L in cash. If V(h) ≥ L, however, it is possible that a pooling outcome exists where types h and l cannot be separated. In this case, type b may be better off bidding { L, 0 } and not revealing itself than bidding { C, α } where C > L and C + α (H -C) -V(h). It will be optimal for type h to do so if the target believes with high enough probability that a bid of { L, 0 } is made by type l and, therefore, accepts such bids with high enough probability. This equilibrium can be ruled out as follows. It is a dominant strategy for the target to accept { C α 1 } over { C, α 2 } If α 1 > α 2 . If the target adopts this rule, then type l will try to offer as high an α as needed to win with probability 1 while keeping C -L. This costs type 1 nothing but is costly for type h to mimic. Hence, it will prefer to separate itself by offering { C, α } with C > L and C + α (H -C) = V(H). This breaks the pooling equilibrium. 12 We arc grateful to one of the referees for suggesting this line of reasoning.
We now state the extension of Proposition 1 to a continuum of types. The proposition can be proved in a straightforward fashion.
Proposition 7. Undersymmetric information, α (x) is strictly decreasing in x and V(x) is strictly increasing in x.
Let us first consider the intuition behind the separating equilibrium with symmetric-information payoffs. An offer { C, α } made by type x is worth Note that g(·) is affine in x. In a separating equilibrium with symmetric-information payoffs, the target will not accept any offer of value less than from type At the same time, the type bidder will make a bid such that it is unprofitable for other types to mimic it. Therefore, the type bidder's problem is such that and Figure 2 demonstrates that a unique solution to this problem exists if and only if V is strictly concave. It can be seen from the figure that the minimum g(x; C, α ) that satisfies conditions (15) and (16) is a straight line that is tangent to V(x) at When V is concave and differentiable, this tangent is the unique supporting hyperplane and is given by where Comparing Equations (14) and (17), the equilibrium offer of type is given by
From Equations (9) and (10) it can be seen that correspond to α * and C*, respectively. It can be verified that C* (·) is a monotonically increasing function and α * (·) is a monotonically decreasing function. We show below that a sufficient condition for the target's payoff from rejection in the separating equilibrium to be the same as that under symmetric information is that V(b) < a. If this condition holds, the target is always better off accepting the value of the second highest bidder in actual competition. Consequently, the value from rejection in the separating equilibrium (when the type of the current bidder is revealed) can be written as It also can be shown that V(x) is concave in x under the condition V(b) < a. 13 The following proposition shows that the strategies and payoffs discussed above also constitute a sequential equilibrium. (18) and (19) respectively.
Proof. The following set of strategies and beliefs constitutes a separating sequential equilibrium with unique payoffs as stated in the proposition. As in Proposition 2, we do not state here the actions and beliefs of players in the off-equilibrium path of actual competition.
Type x bidder offers
as given by Equations (18) The proof that these strategies and beliefs constitute a unique separating equilibrium (in payoffs) is similar to that of the two-type case. n It can be verified from Equation (13) that V is an increasing function of r. Noting that the condition V(b) < a is equivalent to the condition V(b) < L, the proofs that are similar to the proofs of Propositions 4 and 5. Thus, increased potential competition results in greater payoff to the target and in the increased use of cash.
In the case of actual competition, the equilibrium bids are direct extensions of the two-type case discussed in Section 5. We briefly describe the equilibrium bids for the case V(b) < a. Type a bids either {0, 1} or { α, 0}. Type x > a bids { C + ∈, 0) if the cash component of the last bid is C and if C < x. It stops bidding if the cash component of the last bid is greater than or equal to x or if there is no competing bid with cash component greater than or equal to its last bid. The target's strategy is as follows. Suppose the bid with the highest cash component is { C, α}. The target accepts it provided C ≥ a. All other bids are rejected.
Therefore, when the model is extended to a continuum of types, actual competition results in all but the lowest type making all-cash offers. Equity offers and mixed offers are not observed in equilibrium.
Pooling equilibria
We now consider pooling equilibria when the value from rejection is less than a.
14 Suppose a stationary pooling equilibrium exists in which all bidders make the same bid in each period if there is no competition, and the target's belief about the distribution of types coincides with the actual distribution F. Let represent the symmetric-information value of this offer if made by type x. Then the payoff to the target from rejecting the bid is
The two terms in the square brackets are the payoffs to the target from actual competition. The last term represents the payoff to the target when no competition arrives in the next period. In this case, the first bidder submits the same bid as before and the target accepts it if it is greater than or equal to the value from rejection. However, in equilibrium, no bidder will make a bid that is less than V P and be rejected. If it does so, it can possibly gain only in actual competition with a lower type. But even in this case, it has to pay the value of the second-highest bidder, which by our assumption is greater than V P . Therefore, a necessary condition for the existence of the proposed pooling equilibrium is That is, the expected payoff to the target from accepting the equilibrium offer is greater than or equal to its payoff from rejecting the offer. Define V as follows:
That is, V is the expected payoff to the target under symmetric information. Using Equations (20), (21), and (22) it can be shown that (22) is equivalent to Consider the pooling offer where Equation (23) holds as an equality. As illustrated in Figure 3 , Equation (23) and the concavity of V(x) imply that must intersect V(x) at least once and at most twice. The argument that follows applies to the case illustrated in Figure 3 or when intersects V(x) from above. A similar argument can be made if intersects V(x) from below.
We now show that the proposed pooling equilibrium cannot exist. Consider an all-cash offer whose value is where k lies in the interval
There exist values of k for which the target is better off accepting this offer irrespective of its beliefs. To show this, suppose the target believes that the offer was made by type 6. The payoff from rejecting the offer is The expression above is less than This is because the unique fixed-point solution to the equation is V (·), as can be seen from Equation (20). Since and it follows that is greater than the expression in Equation (24). Therefore, there exists some value of k for which the all-cash offer dominates the payoff from rejection. If this is true when the target believes the bidder to be type b, then the same offer will dominate the payoff from rejection for any other belief system, since the value from rejection is a monotonically increasing function of the perceived type. Types greater than z, where z is the type for which are better off making this cash offer. This breaks the proposed pooling equilibrium. If the pooling equilibrium can be broken when Equation (23) holds as an equality, it can be broken when it holds as an inequality. The same argument can be used to break any semipooling equilibrium where pools are formed by connected sets of types.
Conclusions
In this article, we provide an asymmetric-information model with competition to analyze the interaction between the informed bidders and the uninformed target. The dynamic structure of the model enables us to derive the following empirical implications regarding competition, sharing of the synergy, and the medium of exchange.
1. In takeovers financed with a mixture of cash and equity, the higher the amount of cash, the higher the abnormal returns to stockholders of both the acquirer and the target.
2. The fraction of synergy captured by the target decreases with the level of total synergy. Moreover, the higher the cash component, the lower the fraction of synergy captured by the target.
• From Equation (2),
• From Equation (5), Therefore,
The first inequality follows from simple algebra and the second follows from the expressions for V '(h) and V'(l) . n
Proof of Proposition 6
If competition develops, the following strategies and beliefs constitute a sequential equilibrium: It is not difficult to see that the above strategies and beliefs constitute a separating equilibrium. Given the strategies of the other players, type l has to offer the entire synergy to the target to win. Therefore, it can do no better than offering {0, 1}. Type h, as long as it believes the competitor is type l, will try to outbid it by making cash offers of L. It cannot make winning offers with a cash component less than L since such offers will be challenged by type l. If V(h) < L, the lowest winning offer for type h competing with type l is { L, 0}. If V(h) ≥ L, the target will accept only offers of perceived value at least V(b). Also, bidding {0, 1} to mimic type l is more expensive than bidding {max (V(h), L], 0}. If type h faces a competitor of the same type all the synergy is retained by the target and hence it has to bid h in cash.
If the target receives two bids with a cash component greater than or equal to L it believes both bidders to be type h. Its expected payoff from rejecting these offers is since these bidders will compete again in the next period and bid up the offer to H. Therefore, it will accept no bid less than Similarly, if the target receives two bids with a cash component less than L, it will accept no bid less than If it receives only one bid with a cash component greater than L, it believes that bidder to be type h and all other bidders to be type l. In this case, its expected payoff from waiting is V(h). Hence it will accept only bids with perceived value greater than V(h).
This equilibrium outcome may be supported by other strategies. For example, if V(h) < L, type l can bid { L, 0}. Similarly, if V(h) ≥ L, type h can offer a mixture of cash and equity such that C ≥ L and the total value of the offer is equal to V(h). However, the payoffs to the bidders and the target are unique. This is obvious when similar types compete. If type h and type l compete the outcome cannot be below L and since separation occurs, type h has to pay V(h). n
